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No. 2011-CV-1001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARSHALL

DONNIE DOLLAR.
Defendant-Petitioner,
v.
PETER PAYOFF,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

On Appeal from the
Marshall Court of Appeals
First District, No. 2010-016
Circuit Court of Marshall County
No. 10-C-1000
Honorable Bernard Woburt
Judge Presiding
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Whether Petitioner, who arrived late to his Advanced Trial Advocacy
Class and began recording it in the absence of explicit permission
from the professor or any other participant, is excused from the Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute’s requirement that he obtain the
consent of all parties to a conversation prior to initiating a recording
of said conversation.
(2) Whether the public disclosure of Respondent’s kleptomania, initially
communicated solely to his attorney in confidence, is sufficiently offensive to the reasonable person and removed from a legitimate matter of public concern so as to constitute the tort of public disclosure of
private facts.
(3) Whether a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations
is appropriate for summary judgment where the Petitioner expressed
a general intent to interfere on an Internet posting, and later caused
such interference by publicly disclosing private facts, obtained in
part through unlawfully eavesdropping on Respondent.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The Marshall County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Petitioner Donnie Dollar, in Case No. 10-C-1000. The Marshall
Court of Appeals, First District, reversed and remanded for further proceedings in Case No. 2010-016. The Order and Opinion of the Marshall
Court of Appeals can be found on pages 3-12 of the record.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The text of the statutory provisions involved is provided in Appendix
A: Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute 75 MSC § 25-1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Donnie Dollar is an upper-level student at the John Marshall University Law Center in Marshall City. (R. 6). His family is considerably wealthy and politically active. (R. 6). Petitioner’s father,
Dudley Dollar, is the former head of the Donkey Committee, a political
party with views antithetical to that of Peter Payoff, Respondent and
former Mayor of Marshall City. (R. 6). Additionally, David Dollar, Petitioner’s brother, publishes a blog that has openly criticized Mr. Payoff.
(R. 6). A few weeks prior to the incident at issue herein, David Dollar
posted a blog entry concerning business relationships that Mr. Payoff
had formed with Sensational Publications and Ronald Crump for the
production of an autobiography and reality television show, respectively.
(R. 6). Petitioner, eager to “prove to his father that he was worthy of the
family fortunes,” responded to the post: “Payoff is going to make a fortune by talking about his crooked life. Someone should really stop these
deals from happening.” (R. 6).
Petitioner is enrolled in an Advanced Trial Advocacy class taught by
Charlie Cheatem, an adjunct professor at John Marshall University Law
Center and a prominent criminal defense attorney. (R. 4, 6). Mr.
Cheatem acted as Mr. Payoff’s attorney in a highly publicized criminal
trial concerning allegations of corruption during Mr. Payoff’s time in office. (R. 5). When Mr. Payoff’s trial concluded with a hung jury, Mr.
Cheatem invited Mr. Payoff to address his class. (R. 6). On the day in
question, Petitioner arrived late to his Advanced Trial Advocacy class
and found Mr. Payoff discussing his ultimate decision not to testify on
his own behalf. (R. 6).
Although Petitioner was aware of John Marshall University’s policy
requiring permission to audiotape classes, and had in fact asked for such
permission in prior instances, he did not do so during this particular
class. (R. 6). Rather, he retrieved his mini-recorder and began recording

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-1\SFT105.txt

142

unknown

Seq: 4

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

3-JUL-12

11:56

[Vol. XXIX

the discussion without authorization. (R. 6). After Mr. Payoff concluded
his remarks, he left the classroom and Mr. Cheatem dismissed the class
for a break. (R. 6). When the class resumed, a student inquired as to
why it was generally a bad idea for a defendant to testify in his own
defense, as Mr. Payoff had noted earlier. (R. 7). Mr. Cheatem explained
that such testimony opens the door to questions about personal matters
or mental disorders: “for example, if it was revealed that a defendant had
the mental disorder kleptomania, it could be extremely prejudicial, especially in cases involving fraud and dishonesty.” (R. 7). Mr. Cheatem ended class soon after this comment, because he realized he had nearly
violated his client’s confidence; Mayor Payoff, despite his political success and strong record of public service, indeed suffers from kleptomania.
(R. 7, 5). Although undergoing treatment at the John Marshall University Hospital for his condition, he has impulsively pilfered Pete Ross
baseball cards ever since he was a child. (R. 5).
Petitioner had no way of knowing that Mr. Cheatem had actually
revealed confidential information, but he posted the audio recording of
the class discussion to the class’s website, commenting, “the reason Payoff did not testify at his trial was to avoid disclosing that he had the
mental disorder kleptomania.” (R. 7). The website was accessible only to
students of the course, but there were no technological safeguards in
place to prevent posted material from being downloaded and published
elsewhere. (R. 7).
Petitioner’s recording spread like wildfire. (R. 7). Within days, students began commenting on the post and Petitioner continued to push
the rumor along, suggesting that the corruption charges filed against
Mr. Payoff were likely true given his kleptomania. (R. 7). Another student linked the recording to his SpaceBook page, a popular social media
website, and it was soon heard by millions of people worldwide, including
Ronald Crump. (R. 7).
Pursuant to a “morals clause” in Ronald Crump’s contract to produce
a reality television show with Mr. Payoff, which provided that the agreement could be terminated if he was found to be involved in any undisclosed immoral conduct, the pending corruption charges excluded,
Crump cancelled the contract. (R. 7). Sensational Press, conditioning
their agreement for Mayor Payoff’s autobiography on the development
and resultant publicity of the Crump reality show, terminated their
agreement with Mayor Payoff, as well. (R. 7). In short, the public disclosure of Mayor Payoff’s mental condition brought about a loss of millions
of dollars. (R. 7).
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mayor Payoff filed suit against Petitioner for the civil penalty provided by the Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute (“MSES”), 75 MSC
§ 25-1; public disclosure of private facts; and tortious interference with
the contractual relationship established with Crump and Sensational
Press. (R. 7). Following discovery, the Marshall County Circuit Court
granted Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Mr.
Payoff failed to establish each of the three claims as a matter of law. (R.
7). The Marshall Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, reasoning that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment
on all three claims. (R. 8-12). This Court granted leave to appeal. (R. 2).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The First District Court of Appeals correctly reversed the Order of
the Marshall County Circuit Court granting Petitioner summary judgment, as genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to all three of
Respondent’s claims.
VIOLATION

OF THE

MARSHALL STATE EAVESDROPPING STATUTE

Petitioner violated the MSES, 75 MSC § 25-1, when he “use[d an]
electronic device to hear or record” the in-class presentation made by Mr.
Payoff without first obtaining his consent. (R. 14). The trial court incorrectly relied on DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 90 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill.
1999), when it held that Mr. Cheatem’s Advanced Trial Advocacy class
falls outside the scope of the MSES; for the purposes of the MSES, a
“conversation” is “any oral communication between 2 (two) or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that
expectation.” (R. 8, 14). As the case law and plain meaning of the statute indicate, the in-class discussion conducted by Mr. Payoff and Mr.
Cheatem fits squarely within the definition provided by the Marshall
State legislators. At the very least, an issue of genuine material fact exists as to whether or not an in-class discussion is a “conversation” according to the definition provided by the MSES. Moreover, the policies set
forth in the Marshall State University Law Center Student Handbook
(“Handbook”) plainly states that any person wishing to record any class,
either in part or in entirety, is required to first obtain the permission of
the instructor or person conducting the class. (R. 13). Based on the policies set forth in the Handbook, Mr. Payoff and Mr. Cheatem had no reason to believe they would be recorded in the absence of explicitly
obtained permission and, as such, they lacked the notice necessary to
impliedly consent. The unambiguous language of the MSES requires the
consent of all parties prior to recording. (R.6). Thus, Petitioner, by
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knowingly and intentionally using a mini-recorder device to tape his Advanced Trial Advocacy class without first acquiring the consent of all
parties, acted in direct contravention of the MSES, and the grant of summary judgment on this issue was improper.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

OF

PRIVATE FACTS

The tort of public disclosure of private facts is comprised of four distinct elements: the (1) public disclosure; (2) of a private fact; (3) which
would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person; and (4)
which is not of legitimate public concern. Petitioner publicly disclosed a
private fact when he posted an unauthorized recording and accompanying comments regarding Mr. Payoff’s mental disorder, kleptomania, on
the Internet, and in doing so exposed such statements to publicity. (R.
7). Mr. Payoff’s mental disorder is of a highly sensitive and private nature, and Mr. Payoff suffered embarrassment, public scrutiny, and tangible financial losses as a result of this disclosure. (R. 7). Finally, Mr.
Payoff’s mental disorder is not a matter of legitimate public concern,
which is analyzed by balancing the individual’s right to privacy against
the public’s right to information – the latter interest greatly outweighing
the former where the news media makes the disclosure. Furthermore,
given that Petitioner is not a media defendant, he should not be permitted to determine what information is for public consumption. Moreover,
even those who are in the public eye are entitled to retain a zone of privacy, in this case the intimate details of one’s private medical information, which even the public has no right to penetrate. Accordingly, the
First District Court of Appeals decision reversing summary judgment on
Respondent’s public disclosure of private facts claim should be affirmed.
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE

WITH

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

In order to prevail on a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a valid contract between
the plaintiff and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person; (2) that the defendant knows of the
contract; (3) that the defendant intentionally induces the third person
not to perform the contract; (4) and in so doing acts without justification;
(5) resulting in actual damage to plaintiff. First, with regard to the first
and fifth elements, it is undisputed that Respondent entered into valid
contracts with Ronald Crump and Sensational Press Publications and
that their nullification resulted in actual damage to Mr. Payoff. (R. 5, 7).
Second, the knowledge component of the claim may be satisfied either
with actual knowledge of the contract’s existence or with enough knowledge that its existence could be discovered upon reasonable inquiry; it
does not require knowledge of the specific terms of the contract. Peti-
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tioner undoubtedly knew that Mr. Payoff had entered into the aforementioned contracts, as evidenced by his Internet commentary expressing
his hope that someone would prevent both deals from coming to fruition.
(R. 6). Third, Petitioner’s commentary on his brother’s website and the
class webpage, as well as other factors, support the inference that Petitioner intended to interfere with Mr. Payoff’s contractual relationship; at
the very least, the record presents a genuine issue of material fact in this
regard, and the Circuit Court incorrectly held that the truthfulness of
Petitioner’s disclosure was dispositive with respect to his liability. Because there remain triable issues of fact as to whether Petitioner’s actions were justified, the First District Court of Appeals was correct to
reverse summary judgment on Respondent’s tortious interference with
contractual relations claim, and the Court should affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo,
inquiring whether the trial court properly applied the standard for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court must determine whether the order was properly granted in the absence of any genuine dispute of
material fact, and whether the facts entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. See MARSHALL R. CIV. P. 56(c). A fact is material when its resolution “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law,” and a dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) (interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). On review,
“[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO RESOLVE MR. PAYOFF’S
CLAIM THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED THE MARSHALL STATE
EAVESDROPPING STATUTE.
The MSES prohibits the use of any electronic eavesdropping device
to hear or record any part of a conversation without the consent of all
parties. 75 MSC § 25-1. The Marshall State Legislature provided definitions for the terms “eavesdropping device” and “conversation” to clarify
their scope within Section 25-1 of the MSES. For the purposes of the
MSES, “[a]n eavesdropping device is defined as anything used to hear or
record a conversation,” 75 MSC § 25-1(b)(1), and “the term conversation
means any oral communication between 2 (two) or more persons,” 75
MSC § 25-1(b)(2). Where such statutory language is clear and unambig-
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uous, “statutes should be implied and interpreted as they are written.”
Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No. 145, 920 N.E.2d 1087,
1093 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Kozak v. Ret. Bd. of Firemen’s Annuity
& Ben. Fund of Chicago, 447 N.E.2d 394, 399 (Ill. 1983). Moreover,
where legislators have defined the terms utilized within the statute, “the
very terms [the statute] uses should be construed according to those definitions.” In re Marriage of Almquist, 704 N.E.2d 68, 71 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998).
To prove a violation of the MSES, Plaintiff must show: (1) knowing
and intentional use (2) of an eavesdropping device (3) for the purpose of
hearing or recording (4) all or any part of a conversation (5) without the
consent of all parties to the communication. See 75 MSC § 25-1. It is
undisputed Petitioner knowingly and intentionally utilized a mini-recorder to tape his Advanced Trial Advocacy class without first acquiring
the explicit consent of Mr. Cheatem and Mr. Payoff. Moreover, based on
the legislative intent as described above, there can be no question that
the mini-recorder used by Petitioner qualifies as an “eavesdropping device” and that the in-class discussion conducted by Mr. Payoff and Mr.
Cheatem is a protected communication under the MSES. Thus, Mr. Payoff has satisfied his burden in establishing that Petitioner’s acts have
violated the plain and unambiguous language of the MSES.
The Discussion in Petitioner’s Advanced Trial Advocacy Class
Constituted a Conversation Within the Meaning of the Marshall
State Eavesdropping Statute.
The MSES defines conversation as “any oral communication between 2 (two) or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the
parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under
circumstances justifying that expectation.” 75 MSC § 25-1(b)(2). The inclass discussion led by Mr. Payoff and Mr. Cheatem qualifies as a conversation under the statute. Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No.
145, is directly on point. There, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs,
special education teachers, who brought suit against a public school district to prevent them from utilizing audio-recording equipment in certain
special education classrooms, claiming that it violated the Illinois Eavesdropping Act. Id. at 1093. The Illinois Act, nearly identical to the
MSES, defines conversation as “any oral communication between 2 or
more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended
their communication to be of a private nature justifying that expectation.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-1 (2008). The Plock court held that
the type of classroom activity that the special education teachers engage
in constitutes a “conversation” within the meaning of the statute. Plock,
920 N.E.2d at 1093. In order to make this determination, the court distinguished the activities of the teachers in a classroom setting from pub-
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lic speeches, lectures, or rallies taking place in open public spaces like
those at issue in DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 90 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill.
1999). In DeBoer, the court held that a public speech is not a “conversation” within the meaning of the Illinois Act, and therefore not protected.
Id. at 924. The court went on to explain that though not every “audible
expression” is afforded protection, the public speech at issue was highly
distinguishable from conversations in the classroom context due to the
lack of an “exchange.” Id. at 924 (citing Almquist, 704 N.E.2d at 71
(holding that a tape recording playing in the background of a phone call
did not constitute participation in a conversation and that not all audible
sounds will be afforded protection)).
The Marshall County Circuit Court incorrectly relied on DeBoer for
its determination that the type of communication occurring in Mr.
Cheatem’s Advanced Trial Advocacy class falls outside the scope of the
MSES. The Circuit Court, in applying DeBoer, adopted a narrow reading
of “conversation,” requiring mutual discourse rather than a one-sided oratory. (R. 8). The First District Court of Appeals explicitly rejected this
definition and opted instead for a broader reading, stating, “a conversation as defined by the statute could occur in a large group setting with
one primary speaker.” (R. 8). Conversation as defined by DeBoer is restricted to a “mutual discourse as opposed to a statement or declaration
by one person alone.” DeBoer, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 924. Those familiar
with the law school setting and class format are aware of its utilization of
the Socratic Method to encourage a back and forth between the professor
and student, a characteristic which distinguishes it from that of the onesided lecture or public speech. It was not uncommon for Mr. Cheatem
and his students to engage in a discourse. Moreover, the record attests
to the fact that students were free to ask questions during the course of
class, often leading to back and forth exchange on a particular point.
Thus, not only does the nature and format of Mr. Cheatem’s Advanced
Trial Advocacy Class closely resemble the type of classroom interaction
addressed in Plock, but it also satisfies even the narrowest reading of
“conversation” as utilized in DeBoer.
Neither the MSES, nor its accompanying legislative documents, support any contention that the term “conversation” should be interpreted
narrowly. The unambiguous language of the MSES and its definitions
do not support the assertion that the type of discussion that occurred in
Petitioner’s Advanced Trial Advocacy class is somehow unprotected by
MSES. Legislators, in offering definitions to terms utilized within the
statute, felt it necessary to offer clarification as to what types of communications are to be considered conversations for the purpose of the statute. In drafting the statute and the accompanying definitions, to protect
any oral communication between two or more persons, the Marshall
State legislature chose to keep the MSES broad in scope. If Petitioner
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wishes the MSES to be narrowly tailored as to exclude such communication is the classroom setting, his recourse must lie with the Marshall
State Legislature. Even if the Court were to find the dispute over
whether or not classroom communication is protected by the MSES a
valid one requiring the intervention of the judiciary, it is not a determination that should be made at the summary judgment stage. Consequently, the Circuit Court erred when it improvidently granted
summary judgment and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed.
Petitioner Knowingly and Intentionally Used a Mini-Recorder
to Tape the Class Discussion Led By Mr. Payoff and Mr.
Cheatem Without Acquiring the Consent of All Parties.
The MSES requires the consent of all parties to a conversation. 75
MSC § 25-1. Additionally, Section Fourteen of the Handbook requires
that: “[a]ny student, faculty member, or administrator wishing to record
any class or portion of a class must first obtain the permission of the
instructor or any party teaching or conducting a presentation in class
prior to the recording for each class session or portion of each class section.” (R. 13). Despite his awareness of this requirement, Petitioner did
not seek permission and opted instead to violate both the MSES and the
Handbook guidelines because he was tardy to class. As a result, neither
Mr. Cheatem nor Mr. Payoff gave their explicit consent or provided Petitioner with the authorization required to lawfully record the Advanced
Trial Advocacy class.
In certain contexts, absent explicit consent, “implied consent may be
deduced from the prevailing circumstances in a given situation.” People
v. Ceja, 789 N.E.2d 1228, 1241 (Ill. 2003). In Ceja, the defendant was
found to have impliedly consented to eavesdropping when, with full
knowledge that he was being monitored, the statements he made to another inmate in a holding cell were overheard via an intercom. Id. at
1241. Unlike Ceja, the case at bar is not a context in which implied consent may be inferred. Section Fourteen of the Handbook makes the conduct expected by all students, faculty members, administrators, and
guest speakers abundantly clear. According to the protocol, permission
to record is to be explicitly sought for each and every instance of recording and as such cannot be inferred from prior history or custom. (R. 13).
Correspondingly, consent to recording cannot be implied as it must be
explicitly sought and provided. Ceja also suggests that implied consent
can be inferred from “the language or acts that tend to prove that a party
knows of, or assents to, encroachments on the routine expectation that
conversations are private.” Ceja, 789 N.E.2d at 1241. Mr. Cheatem and
Mr. Payoff had no reason to anticipate that the class may have been recorded; thus, unlike the defendant in Ceja, they lacked the notice neces-
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sary to consent through acts or language showing assent. In fact, they
had every reason to believe, based on the protocol outlined by the Marshall State University Law Center, that the class would not be recorded
in the absence of their explicit permission. Furthermore, there is evidence in the record to suggest that even the Marshall University Law
Center administration felt that the unauthorized recording of school lectures was an act likely to fall under the purview of the MSES. Thus,
they enacted the strict policies regarding recording, as set forth in Section Fourteen of the Handbook, in order to prevent potential MSES violations. (R. 4). In light of the foregoing reasons, implied consent by Mr.
Cheatem and Mr. Payoff cannot be deduced. However, assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that implied consent may be deduced in light
of all the circumstances, the issue of whether or not consent was issued,
either explicitly or implicitly, should be submitted to a jury and not decided at the summary judgment stage.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT PETITIONER
PUBLICLY DISCLOSED A PRIVATE FACT WHEN HE
DISSEMINATED, VIA THE INTERNET, PRIVATE INFORMATION
ABOUT MR. PAYOFF’S MENTAL HEALTH DISORDER THAT WAS
NOT OF PUBLIC CONCERN.
An individual’s right to privacy is of paramount importance, and has
been recognized as fundamental since 1890, when Justices Warren and
Brandeis published their groundbreaking article on the subject. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Thereafter, courts began to acknowledge this
right as one worthy of legal protection. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 385-89 (1960). At law, four distinctly separate privacy invasions gained recognition: intrusion into one’s solitude and private affairs, the misappropriation of an individual’s likeness, false light
publicity, and public disclosure of private facts embarrassing to the individual. Id. at 389. Mr. Payoff has brought this claim against the Petitioner for the public disclosure of private facts. Petitioner publicly
disclosed private information, via the Internet, about Mr. Payoff’s
mental health and in doing so subjected him to suffer embarrassment,
public backlash in the form of repudiated political support, and considerable financial loss due to nullified business contracts.
The Marshall Court of Appeals adopted the test set forth in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998), to evaluate
a claim for the public disclosure of private facts. (R. 11). According to
this test, in order to sustain an action for public disclosure of private
facts, a plaintiff must show: (1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3)
which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and
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(4) which is not of legitimate public concern. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478.
Petitioner publicly disclosed private facts about Mr. Payoff that did not
rise to the level of public concern when he posted an unauthorized audio
recording and accompanying comments to his school’s Advanced Trial
Advocacy Class webpage disclosing that Mr. Payoff suffers from the
mental disorder, kleptomania. (R. 7). As Mr. Payoff’s mental disorder is
of a personal and sensitive nature, such a disclosure would be considered
highly offensive to a reasonable person. Therefore, this Court should
find that, by disclosing information on the Internet regarding Mr. Payoff’s mental disorder that would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person, Petitioner committed the tort of public disclosure of
private facts.
Petitioner Disclosed Mr. Payoff’s Private Condition When He
Posted Commentary on the Internet About Mr. Payoff’s
kleptomania.
Publication is no longer limited to traditional sources of news media
such as newspapers or television news broadcasts, but has expanded to
include, among other things, the Internet. The Internet, with its universal accessibility, has created an outlet for endless publication. Courts
have recognized that “[a]ny person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information.” Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997). The requirement of public
disclosure generally connotes publicity; publicity requires communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons, so as to
become some matter of public knowledge. See Green v. Chicago Tribune
Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Brown v. Mullarkey, 632 S.W.2d
507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d
1291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). Utilizing a vehicle like the Internet, published statements on webpages and blogs have the ability to reach an
infinite and indiscriminate audience. “[The Internet] constitutes a vast
platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of
millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.” Reno, 521 U.S. at
853.
Petitioner posted comments regarding Mr. Payoff’s mental disorder,
kleptomania, on the webpage for his Advanced Trial Advocacy Class and
in doing so promulgated and exposed such statements to publicity.
Though the school webpage on which Petitioner initially disseminated
information was limited in access to students of the class, this point has
no bearing on his liability. Even where a matter becomes inadvertently
public by means initiated by the defendant, the defendant can still be
held liable for public disclosure. Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940
P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997); Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 529-30
(Mich. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Bradley v. Saranac Cmty.
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Sch. Bd. of Educ., 565 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1997). It is undisputed that
because of Petitioner’s initial disclosure the information eventually
reached a massive audience. (R. 7). Petitioner’s comments and posted
recording were made entirely public when they were transferred to the
website “Spacebook,” a freely accessible domain. (R. 7). Subsequently,
the national media began to broadcast the recording, thus exposing Mr.
Payoff’s condition to the entire world. (R. 7).
Mr. Payoff’s Mental Health Disorder Was of a Private and
Sensitive Nature and Not Part of the Public Record.
Mr. Payoff’s struggle with the mental disorder, kleptomania, is an
intimate fact of the utmost sensitivity. In order to succeed on a claim for
public disclosure of private facts, a plaintiff must next prove that the
facts disclosed were private in nature. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B (1977). Facts that are part of the public record will not be considered private. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 n.7 (1989); Robert
C. Ozer, P.C., 940 P.2d 371; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1977). However, according the to the Restatement, facts related to intimate family matters, sexual relations, and “unpleasant or disgraceful or
humiliating illnesses” are private in nature and are thus awarded privacy protection, the disclosure of which can constitute an invasion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). Courts applying this
standard have recognized health as a distinct category of facts meritorious of privacy protection. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s Brooks
Bros., Inc., 492 A.2d 580, 587-88 (D.C. 1985) (plaintiff’s cosmetic surgery
was private in nature); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (plaintiff’s mastectomy was considered private); Young v.
Jackson, 572 So.2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990) (plaintiff had a right to keep
hysterectomy private and therefore disclosure was actionable); Hillman
v. Columbia Cnty., 474 N.W.2d 913, 923 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (plaintiff’s
HIV-positive status was private). Consequently, issues regarding treatment or the nature of a medical condition have typically been considered
private. Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 829-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
Few things are as intimate and private in nature as one’s medical
health and history. In Sargeant v. Serrani, 866 F. Supp. 657 (D. Conn.
1994), a Connecticut police officer brought an invasion of privacy claim
following the publication of statements by the town mayor alleging the
plaintiff had abused sick leave policy and made statements referring to
the plaintiff’s health. The court found that “[a] reasonable person would
consider Sargeant’s medical diagnosis to be a private fact, and Sargeant
did not voluntarily reveal this fact but actively sought to keep it private.”
Id. at 667. Mr. Payoff’s struggle with the mental disorder kleptomania
was entirely private. Mr. Payoff expressed considerable concern that
this private information not become public when he disclosed his condi-
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tion to his attorney, Mr. Cheatem. Furthermore, Mr. Payoff was assured
that this information would remain private as it is protected by attorneyclient confidentiality. Though Mr. Payoff had sought medical attention
for his condition at the University of Marshall Hospital, the nature and
substance of these sessions is protected by doctor-patient confidentiality
and was not a matter of public knowledge prior to Petitioner’s disclosure.
Mental health conditions are often associated with a social stigma. This
public perception of mental health ailments aids in placing them in the
category of “disgraceful or humiliating illnesses,” as outlined by the Restatement; a distinction which affords them protection as private facts.
A Reasonable Person Would Find That the Invasion of Mr.
Payoff’s Privacy and the Disclosure and Exploitation of His
Mental Heath Disorder Was Highly Offensive.
In order to succeed on his public disclosure of private facts claim,
Mr. Payoff must show that the published fact in question would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D cmt c (1977). A disclosure that would inflict embarrassment or emotional distress on a reasonable person is considered highly
offensive. Robert C. Ozer, P.C., 940 P.2d at 378. When analyzing the
highly offensive requirement, “the determination of whether a disclosure
is highly offensive to the reasonable person is a question of fact and depends on the circumstances of a particular case.” Id. Moreover, where
there is a dispute regarding the offensiveness of the publication and determination as a matter of law is not possible, the issue presents a “question of fact for the jury to determine.” Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 903. The
potential for reasonable minds to disagree regarding the offensiveness of
publication presents an issue of material fact, and where such a dispute
is genuine the grant of summary judgment is improper.
Courts often draw on the various factors related to society’s perception of offensiveness when determining if a disclosure is highly offensive.
This reliance on societal perception is often supplemented by a factual
and circumstantial inquiry into the context of the publication. See Robert C. Ozer, P.C., 940 P.2d at 378 (whether or not a disclosure is highly
offensive is a question of fact that largely depends on the circumstances
of a given case); Green, 675 N.E.2d 249 (proposing that when analyzing
the highly offensive requirement the court “examine the allegations of
the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the publication as
well as the publication itself”). Due to the private and sensitive nature of
his disorder, Mr. Payoff has suffered substantial embarrassment and
backlash after this information became public knowledge. Following
publication, Mr. Payoff lost out on profitable contracts, suffered loss of
backing from many of his strongest supporters, and was presumed to be
guilty of corruption, all as a result of the disclosure of his mental disor-

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-1\SFT105.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 15

3-JUL-12

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

11:56

153

der. A reasonable person could determine that the disclosure of such an
intimate fact and the resultant embarrassment and harmful consequences of its publication are highly offensive. In Swarthout v. Mut.
Serv. Life Insurance Company, 632 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001), the court held that the issue of whether or not disclosure of plaintiff’s use of high blood pressure medication was highly offensive constituted an issue of fact for a jury to determine and as such summary
judgment was precluded. The disclosure in the present case is even more
extreme. Whether or not the disclosure of Mr. Payoff’s mental disorder is
highly offensive remains a question of fact for a jury and one that should
not be disposed of at the summary judgment stage.
While Mr. Payoff’s Career and Public Persona May be
Newsworthy, the Intimate Details of His Mental Health Are
Not.
The final element of a public disclosure of private facts claim is that
the subject of the publication be one that is not of legitimate public concern. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478. The newsworthiness of a publication is
determined by a standard that is generally one based on community mores and commonly held perceptions of decency. See Virgil v. Time, Inc.,
527 F.2d 1122, 1129 n.12 (9th Cir. 1975); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.,
188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977); DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:17
(2011). Where courts utilize community standards and perceptions to
guide their analysis, the determination is one of fact on which reasonable
minds can disagree; as such it is a determination that should be submitted to a jury. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129 n.12; Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
The fact that Mr. Payoff suffers from a mental disorder for which he
seeks medical treatment is not a matter of legitimate public concern.
Private medical information of a highly sensitive and confidential nature
should be insulated from intrusion, despite any general interest in the
lives of individuals in the public eye. Mr. Payoff has endured a life long
struggle with kleptomania, which manifests itself in an uncontrollable
urge to steal Pete Rose baseball cards. This is a highly limited manifestation and one that had no negative impact on his ability to serve as
Mayor of Marshall City. Though public figures may sacrifice some modicum of privacy interest with regard to their public personas, to allow the
public to penetrate one’s private medical history under the guise of legitimate public concern would be to allow morbid and sensational prying
into the private lives of individuals merely because they are of general
interest. Whether or not Mr. Payoff’s mental health disorder or the medical treatment he seeks can be considered a matter of legitimate public
concern, is one on which reasonable minds can disagree. Thus, it is an
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issue that should be submitted to a jury and not dismissed of at the summary judgment stage.
1.

Petitioner does not qualify for the heightened deference
given to media outlets defending against claims of public
disclosure of private facts.

Courts often analyze legitimate public concern in terms of newsworthiness. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1122, 1128-29. The public’s interest in
matters of legitimate public concern is often protected and enabled by
constitutionally recognized rights of free speech and freedom of the
press; such interests will inevitably come into play when analyzing the
newsworthiness. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478; Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
Moreover, whether the fact was newsworthy should be “measured along
a sliding scale of competing interests; the individual’s right to keep private facts from the public’s gaze versus the public’s right to know.” Diaz,
188 Cal. Rptr. at 771. The Shulman court considered a three factor analysis when determining newsworthiness: first, the “normative assessment
of the ‘social value’ of a publication”; second, the degree of intrusion and
the extent to which the plaintiff played an important role in public
events; and third, some sort of nexus between the information discloses
and “the nature of the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public attention.” Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484. This analysis places great
weight on freedom of the press and the media’s right to determine matters of legitimate public interest. Whether or not a non-media defendant
has the authority to determine what matters are newsworthy has yet to
be addressed by this Court. In the present case, Petitioner is not a media
defendant and neither Petitioner’s Advanced Trial Advocacy class
webpage nor Spacebook are the type of sources worthy of media protection. Because Petitioner’s non-media status has a significant bearing on
the issue of legitimate public concern and as this Court has not yet set a
standard for non-media defendants, Petition should not a priori be afforded the higher deference given to media defendants in cases like
Virgil and Shulman.
2.

Even if Mr. Payoff is considered a Public Figure, the intimate
details of his mental health are not matters of legitimate public
concern and should be protected from intrusion.

Despite the broad scope and reach of public concern, the Restatement acknowledges that a “line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases
to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own
sake.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977). Additionally, courts have imposed limitations on the scope of the public’s interest
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in certain matters. Vassiliades concerned the disclosure of before and
after images of the plaintiff’s cosmetic surgery procedure, by her physician, on a local televised program promoting an upcoming department
store showcase entitled “Creams versus Plastic Surgery.” 492 A.2d at
585. The court held that “[c]ertain private facts about a person should
never be publicized, even if the facts concern matters which are, or relate
to persons who are, of legitimate public interest.” Id. at 587-88. As
noted above, the Restatement offers protection those illnesses that are
“disgraceful or humiliating.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
cmt. b (1977). As kleptomania is a stigmatized and widely misunderstood disorder, it falls squarely in this distinct category outlined by the
Restatement. Thus, it is precisely the sort of private information that,
according to the court in Vassiliades, ought to be shielded from publicity.
In Gallela v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973), despite acknowledging that Mrs. Onassis was a prominent public figure and therefore
“subject to news coverage,” the court maintained that a public figure is
still entitled to retain some privacy rights. In Diaz, a student body president brought suit for public disclosure of private facts against a newspaper for alleging that she was a transsexual. In holding that Diaz’s sexual
identity was not newsworthy as a matter of law, the California court recognized that, “[w]here the publicity is so offensive as to constitute a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, it serves no
legitimate public interest and is not deserving of protection.” Diaz, 88
Cal. Rptr. at 773.
As addressed above, various courts have “concluded that there is no
legitimate public interest generally in disclosure of private medical information.” See DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:17 (2011). White v.
Township of Winthrop, 116 P.3d 1034, 1038 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), concerned a full-time deputy marshal, suffering from epilepsy, who was
forced to resign when his medical treatment conflicted with his ability to
perform his professional duties. The court found that the legitimacy of a
public interest in the specific nature of the plaintiff’s medical condition,
as opposed to a more generalized legitimate public interest “in the announcement that his resignation was for health reasons,” was an issue
for the jury. Id. at 1038. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that
medical information is not protected as a matter of law, at the very least
a jury should be allowed to balance Mr. Payoff’s significant interest in
the privacy of his medical condition against the public’s interest in his
persona. Moreover, this Court should acknowledge the serious implications to public policy in sanctioning the disclosure of one’s private medical information and recognize that to allow publication of an individual’s
medical history and treatment would constitute the type of morbid and
sensational prying addressed by the Restatement.
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The grant of summary judgment by the Circuit Court was improper
in light of the genuine issues of material fact that exist as to the deference that should be afforded to a non-media defendant and whether or
not Mr. Payoff’s medical condition is newsworthy. As such, summary
judgment on these issues was correctly precluded and the decision of the
Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MR. PAYOFF’S TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE CLAIM.
While the case sub judice is one of first impression in the State of
Marshall, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations are well defined. The plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a
valid contract between the plaintiff and a third person which confers
upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person;1 (2) the
defendant knows of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally induces
the third person not to perform the contract; (4) and in so doing acts
without justification; (5) resulting in actual damage to plaintiff.” Gupton
v. Son-Lan Dev. Co., 695 S.E.2d 763, 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). Upon
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff “need not prove
his claim; he need only show that there is a genuine issue of material fact
as to each of these elements.” Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir.
2004). Here, there is no question that a reasonable jury could, and indeed should conclude that Petitioner knew of Mr. Payoff’s contracts and
posted his comments to the Internet with the express intention of interfering therewith. As the Marshall Court of Appeals recognized, the trial
court therefore improvidently granted Petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment, and its judgment must be affirmed.
Mr. Payoff Need Not Demonstrate Petitioner Had Knowledge of
the Specific Provisions of His Contract With Ronald Crump,
But Rather Only That He Knew of its Existence.
At trial, Petitioner claimed that there was insufficient evidence for a
jury to find he had knowledge of Mr. Payoff’s contracts with Ronald
Crump and Sensational Press Publications, principally because he was
not aware of the legal particulars thereof. (R. 10). Not only does this
argument confuse the “knowledge” element of a tortious interference
claim, but there is also ample evidence to create a triable issue of fact.
Inextricably bound up with the question of intent, it is essential a
defendant have knowledge of the contract with which he is purported to
1. Defendants concede that a valid and enforceable contract existed between Mr. Payoff and Ronald Crump. (R. 10).
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interfere. Gianacopoulos v. MOS Design, Inc., No. 3:05-2417, 2008 WL
1774094, at *6 (M.D. Pa. April 16, 2008) (“It is obvious that one cannot
intentionally interfere with a contract of which he has no knowledge.”).
Neither the courts of the State of Marshall or any other jurisdiction have
ever required, however, that the defendant have complete, actual knowledge of the agreement’s particulars and attendant circumstances.
Rather, the knowledge element may be satisfied by either actual knowledge that a contract exists, or “knowledge of facts which, if followed by
reasonable inquiry, would have led to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties.” See Cont’l Research, Inc. v.
Cruttenden, Podesta & Miller, 222 F. Supp. 190, 199 (D. Minn. 1963)
(quoting Swaney v. Crawley, 191 N.W. 583, 584 (Minn. 1923)). Knowledge of the contract is necessary only to the extent required to demonstrate that the defendant acted with the purpose of interfering. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. i (1979). Accordingly, “the
defendant need not have full knowledge of all the detailed terms of the
contract.” Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 796 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (citing Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp.,
406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1980)); see also Ryan, Elliott & Co., Inc. v. Leggat,
McCall & Werner, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979);
Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1112-13 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
“The element of knowledge by the defendant is a question of fact, and
proof may be predicated on circumstantial evidence.” Texaco 729 S.W.2d
at 797 (citing American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.,
331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
There is no question on this record that Petitioner knew Mr. Payoff
had entered into contracts to appear on a reality television show and to
author a biography. News of the contracts had made national headlines
and had also been published on David Dollar’s Internet site. Even if Petitioner had not heard of the contracts through national media outlets,
he certainly read about them on his brother’s website; just a few hours
after the posting, Petitioner commented, “Payoff is going to make a fortune by talking about his crooked life. Someone should really stop these
deals from happening.” (R. 6).
While the record is silent as to the level of detail communicated by
David Dollar and the news media, Petitioner had sufficient knowledge to
preclude summary judgment on the element of knowledge; his argument
that he did not have knowledge of the “morals clause” and there could
not have intended to interfere was squarely rejected in Posner. There,
the plaintiff claimed that the Lankenau Hospital’s bad faith refusal to let
him add an additional pulmonary physician to the medical staff caused
him to incur an inordinate workload, which ultimately led to the cancellation of his prospective contract to provide diagnostic services to several
hospitals in the Virgin Islands. Posner, 645 F. Supp. at 1112. In re-
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sponse to the hospital’s motion for summary judgment arguing, inter
alia, that it had no knowledge of the terms of the contracts, Posner
claimed that “everyone” knew about the deals, and that that was enough
to create a triable issue of fact. Id. at 1112-13. Agreeing, the court first
rejected the hospital’s argument that knowledge of the contracts’ specific
terms was required as a matter of law. Rather, “the actor must have
knowledge of the contract with which he is interfering and of the fact he
is interfering with the performance of a contract.” Id. at 1112. The court
acknowledged that awareness of the detailed terms of the contract would
support the requirement that the hospital knew it was interfering, but
held the absence of such knowledge nondispositive: “Because questions
of fact exist concerning the question of whether defendants knew that
their actions would interfere with plaintiff’s prospective business relations in the Virgin Islands . . . [the Court] will deny defendants’ motion
on this issue.” Id. at 1113.
Similarly, Mr. Payoff need not have demonstrated at trial that Petitioner knew of the morals clause, or any other provision of the agreement, because there are sufficient facts on which a reasonable jury could
conclude Petitioner knew he was interfering with the contracts. First, at
this stage of the proceedings, the details of the contract with which Petitioner were familiar are unknown. It is entirely possible, for example,
that he learned of the morals clause through the reporting of one of numerous media outlets that ran the story. Although he argues before this
court that he had no knowledge of the provision (R. 10), the trial court
did not make a specific finding of fact one way or another. Summary
judgment is inappropriate where, as here, issues of material fact ultimately turn on the credibility of witnesses. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255. If Petitioner had not learned of the morals clause specifically, a reasonable jury may also be entitled to infer that he had assumed there
would be such a clause when he acted. Petitioner, after all, was at the
time of his actions an upper-level classman at the Marshall State University Law Center, and presumably familiar with the types of provisions commonly found in contracts like the ones at issue. On motion for
summary judgment, the non-moving party is entitled to inferences such
as these. Id. Finally, and most critically, even if Petitioner had no
knowledge whatsoever of the moral clause, his knowledge of the contract
itself, coupled with a demonstrable intent to interfere therewith, is sufficient to meet this element of the tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 cmt. i (1979); Posner, 645 F. Supp. at 1112-13.
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Genuine Issues of Material Fact With Regard To Whether
Petitioner Intended to Interfere With Mr. Payoff’s Contracts
Precluded Summary Judgment.
As noted by the court below, “[i]ntent may be formed by acting for
the purpose of interfering with the contract, desiring to interfere while
acting for some other reason, or knowing that interference is certain or
substantially certain to occur.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766
cmt. j (1979). “[I]ntentional interference does not require an intent to
injure, only an intent to cause interference or a substantial certainty
that interference will occur.” Wardlaw v. Inland Container Corp., 76
F.3d 1372, 1376 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo
Tex., Inc., 813 S.W.2d 613, 619 (Tex. App. 1991)). Here, the procedural
posture of this case is critical: “Where the defendant’s intent is at issue,
summary judgment is appropriate only if all reasonable inferences defeat the plaintiff’s claims.” White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir.
1990) (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted); see also Lac Du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty
Abuse–Wis., Inc., 991 F.2d 1249, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[C]ases involving
motivation and intent are usually not appropriate for summary
judgment.”).
Several factors conspire to “raise[ ] a conflict sufficient to create a
jury question on the issue of intent.” Wardlaw, 76 F.3d at 1376. First,
Petitioner’s post on his brother’s Internet site “a few weeks” before his
unlawful disclosure of Mr. Payoff’s kleptomania evinces knowledge of
Mr. Payoff’s relationships with Crump and Sensational, as well as a desire that they be destroyed. Petitioner wrote, “Payoff is going to make a
fortune by talking about his crooked life. Someone should really stop
these deals from happening.” (R. 6). Upon hearing Cheatem discuss a
history of kleptomania as one reason a defendant may choose not to testify at trial, Petitioner seized upon the opportunity. Not only did he post
the recording of the lecture in clear contravention of Marshall State University’s Code of Conduct, but he also added the comment, “the reason
Payoff did not testify at his trial was to avoid disclosing that he had the
mental disorder kleptomania.” (R. 7). At the time of his posting, Petitioner had no reason to even believe in the truth of this statement;
Cheatem was not referring to Mr. Payoff during the lecture, nor did he
allude that this may have been the reason Mr. Payoff chose not to testify.
Rather, Petitioner engineered the statement with the express purpose of
interfering with Mr. Payoff’s contractual relations.
Petitioner’s argument before this Court, that he was “justified in
posting the lecture online in that the public has a right to know that
Plaintiff Payoff was a thief,” (R. 10), belies any contention that he did not
intend the post to propagate through the Internet as it did. Petitioner
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posted his comment knowing that the “public” would receive his message. Having familiarity with the University’s website and knowing full
well that Mr. Payoff was the “talk of the Marshall City legal community,”
(R. 7), Petitioner counted on students to spread the rumor he started.
Fanning the fire along the way, Petitioner additionally posted that the
bribery charges levied against Mr. Payoff were probably true. (R. 7).
Whether he acted principally to interfere with the agreements, or
whether he considered the resulting interference a welcome consequence
of informing the public is inconsequential. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766, cmt. j (1979). An upper classman at the Marshall State
University Law Center, Petitioner may very well have known the elements of tortious interference and, while desiring to interfere with the
contracts, chose a seemingly innocuous forum to initiate the rumor precisely to avoid civil liability. Lending further support to such an inference, nearly Petitioner’s entire family is engaged in political campaigns
antithetical to Mr. Payoff’s positions. Petitioner’s father, whom he is on
the record as being anxious to impress, is the head of the Donkey Committee. Viewing these facts in their totality, a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that Petitioner posted the lecture and started the rumor
of Mr. Payoff’s kleptomania maliciously, with an aim to impress his father and stop Mr. Payoff from “making a fortune by talking about his
crooked life.” (R. 6).
“It is not this Court’s function . . . to weigh conflicting evidence and
inferences, or to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Rather, [its] role
is merely to [ask whether] a substantial conflict existed in the evidence
to create a jury question.” Wardlaw, 76 F.3d at 1378. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Respondent, this case should have been
sent to the jury.
The Trial Court’s Reliance on Miller v. Lockport Realty Group,
Inc. Was Misplaced, as Liability for Interference With
Contractual Relations May Be Imposed Notwithstanding
the Truthfulness of Petitioner’s Speech.
The trial court was also incorrect to hold, as a matter of law, that
Petitioner could not have intended to interfere with Mr. Payoff’s contracts because he was providing only truthful information. (See R. 10
(citing Miller v. Lockport Realty Group, Inc., 878 N.E.2d 171, 179 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007))). Not only does the proposition fly in the face of common
sense, but the court wrenches Miller out of context; while truthfulness
may serve as a proxy for the wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct in
some circumstances, here there are bases of liability independent of the
veracity of Petitioner’s statements. First, it is not at all clear how Petitioner could not have intended to interfere with Mr. Payoff’s contractual
relations simply because he began a rumor which ultimately proved to be
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true. If one has the destruction of a contractual relationship as his objective, and can accomplish the task through purposeful direction of the
truth, his conduct does not become any less wrongful. A defendant’s liability “may arise from improper motives or from the use of improper
means.” Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365,
1371 (Or. 1978) (emphasis added). Rather, the trial court should have
considered Miller as it impacts the fourth element of Mr. Payoff’s tortious interference claim: that Petitioner “acted without justification.”
Gupton, 695 S.E.2d at 770.2
“[T]he concept of ‘justification’ is not clearly defined in the law of
interference with contractual relations.” Blair v. Boulger, 336 N.W.2d
337, 341 (N.D. 1983). However, most jurisdictions consider this element
to require an inquiry into whether the defendant’s actions were improper. See, e.g., Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327, 337-38
(N.D. 1987); see also PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS § 129 (W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, David G. Owen eds., 5th ed. 1984)
(“[I]t is clear that liability is to be imposed only if the defendant intends
to interfere with the plaintiff’s contractual relations, at least in the sense
that he acts with knowledge that interference will result, and if, in addition, he acts for an improper purpose.”).
In determining whether an actor’s conduct in intentionally interfering
with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, consideration is given to the following factors: (a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the
other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought
to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the
freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference
and (g) the relations between the parties.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979). The interplay between
these factors is critical to the proper application of the law. “If the conduct is independently wrongful – as, for example, if it is illegal because it
is in restraint of trade . . . the desire to interfere with the other’s contractual relations may be less essential to a holding that the interference is
improper.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1979). “On
the other hand, if the means used by the actor are innocent or less
blameworthy, the desire to accomplish the interference may be more essential to a holding that the interference is improper.” Id. Like the elements discussed above, “[w]hether or not interference with contractual
2. In many jurisdictions, the burden of pleading and proving that the interfering conduct was nevertheless “justified” is placed on the defendant. See, e.g., Roy v. Coyne, 630
N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The Court need not resolve this question in the case at
bar; no matter where the burden is placed, triable issues of fact precluded summary judgment on this element.
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relations is justified is basically a question of fact.” Blair, 336 N.W.2d at
342.
Factor (a): The nature of the actor’s conduct.
The nature of the actor’s conduct must be considered, as “liability
may arise from improper motives or from the use of improper means.”
Top Serv. Body Shop, 582 P.2d at 1371 (Or. 1978) (emphasis added).
Acts may be improper “by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a
recognized rule of common law, or perhaps an established standard of a
trade or profession.” Id. Here, there are triable issues of fact as to
whether Petitioner’s conduct was wrongful in nature; there is evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he not only violated the
MSES, 75 MSC § 25-1, but that he also publicly disclosed private facts in
violation of the common law.
Properly understood, Miller and Soderlund Bros., Inc. v. Carrier
Corp., 663 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), upon which Miller relies, go no
further than to illustrate the often-critical importance of this factor in
evaluating the conduct at issue’s propriety. In Soderlund Bros., the defendant claimed it bore no liability for interference with a prospective
contract because it was merely competing with the plaintiff’s business.
Id. at 10. Reasoning that the defendant’s motive was therefore not improper, the court went on to consider whether the same could be said of
the means employed: “the defendant can raise . . . the privilege of competition provided, of course, the defendant has not employed a wrongful
means and is not motivated solely by malice or ill-will.” Id. “Acts of competition which are never privileged include fraud, deceit, intimidation or
deliberate disparagement . . . [which] require[ ] proof that the statement
be false.” Id. In this context, and in this context alone, “there is no liability for interference with a prospective contractual relation on the part
of one who merely gives truthful information to another.” Id. at 11.
Where there are other indicia of wrongfulness, however, the truthfulness
of the statements do not insulate the defendant from liability.3
Factor (b): The actor’s motive.
As discussed, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Petitioner
acted with the deliberate intention of destroying Mr. Payoff’s contractual
3. Miller and Soderlund Bros. also involved claims for interference with prospective
business relationships, as opposed to contractual relations. “The difference between the
two torts is that the tort of interference with contractual relations affords a greater degree
of protection to the parties to a business relationship. The sacrosanct contractual relation
takes precedence over the conflicting rights of any presumptive interferor, including his
right to compete and his own prospective advantage.” Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 413
N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 129, at 945 (4th
ed. 1971)) (emphasis added).
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relationships with Crump and Sensational. “Where the actor’s conduct
is not criminal or fraudulent, and absent some other aggravating circumstances, it is necessary to identify those whom the actor had a specific
motive or purpose to injure by his interference and to limit liability accordingly. The extent of liability . . . is fixed in part by the motive or
purpose of the actor.” DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d
1340 (9th Cir. 1980). Just a few weeks before beginning the rumor regarding Mr. Payoff’s kleptomania, Petitioner had written, “Payoff is going to make a fortune by talking about his crooked life. Someone should
really stop these deals from happening.” (R. 6). This, coupled with Petitioner’s family’s rivalry with Mr. Payoff, suggests that his motivation in
violating the eavesdropping statute and disclosing private facts was precisely to interfere with the contracts.
Factor (c): The interests of the other with which the
actor’s conduct interferes.
This factor recognizes that “[s]ome contractual interests receive
greater protection than others.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767
cmt. e (1979). “[T]he fact that a contract violates public policy, as, for
example, a contract in unreasonable restraint of trade . . . may justify an
inducement of breach that, in the absence of this fact, would be improper.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. e (1979). Nothing
about Mr. Payoff’s relationship with Crump and Sensational tends to excuse Petitioners’ actions, so this factor should not carry any significance
in the Court’s analysis.
Factor (d): The interests sought to be advanced by the actor.
“In some cases the actor may be seeking to promote not solely an
interest of his own but a public interest.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 767 cmt. f (1979). In such cases, the analysis requires an inquiry
into whether the defendant’s conduct was justified in that the public interest was ultimately vindicated. Relevant questions in determining
whether his interference is improper include: “[W]hether the actor actually believes that the practices are prejudicial to the public interest,
whether his belief is reasonable, whether he is acting in good faith for
the protection of the public interest, and whether the actor employs
wrongful means to accomplish the result.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 767 cmt. e (1979). At trial, Petitioner suggested that his actions
were not wrongful because “the public has a right to know that Plaintiff
Payoff was a thief.” (R.10). Regardless of whether Petitioner was actually intending to act virtuously in starting a rumor regarding Mr. Payoff’s kleptomania, the method he chose was against the law. Such
private facts were not appropriate for disclosure, and the MSES explic-
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itly prohibited the recording of the class lecture. This is not the type of
interest that this factor is designed to safeguard.
Factor (e): The social interests in protecting the freedom of
action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other.
The social interests in protecting the actions of the defendant on the
one hand, and the contractual security of the plaintiff on the other, are
typically taken into account only when a direct balancing of the private
interests leads to a stalemate. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
767 cmt. g (1979). Mr. Payoff’s interest in the security of his contractual
relations, as well as his interest in keeping private facts concerning his
mental and physical health private, towers above any interest asserted
by Petitioner in this case. Even if social interests in the matter are considered, however, “both social and private interests concur in the determination that persuasion only by suitable means is permissible . . . .”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. g (1979) (emphasis added).
Factor (f): The proximity or remoteness of the actor’s
conduct to the interference.
Where the defendant’s conduct immediately and directly interferes
with another’s contractual relations, “other factors need not play as important a role in the determination that the actor’s interference was improper.” JamSports and Ent’mt, LLC v. Paradama Prod., Inc., 360 F.
Supp. 2d 905, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 767 cmt. h (1979)). Again, however, “[t]he weight of this factor . . . may be controverted by the factor of motive if it was the actor’s
primary purpose to interfere . . . or perhaps by the factor of the actor’s
conduct if that conduct was inherently unlawful or independently tortious.” Id.
Factor (g): The relations between the parties.
Finally, this factor evaluates whether the relationship between the
parties has any bearing on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s action.
In a case where the defendant, through some power he has over the
plaintiff as a result of a business relationship, interferes with a contract,
the interference may not necessarily be wrongful. Halverson v. Murzynski, 487 S.E.2d 19, 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 767 cmt. i (1979)). Of course, no such situation is present in
the case at bar. If anything, the relationship between the parties tends
only to bolster the inference of wrongfulness: Petitioner and his family
are active political rivals of Mr. Payoff.
On balance, the factors identified by the Restatement weigh heavily
in support of a factual finding that Petitioner’s conduct was not justified.
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The Marshall County Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment to Petitioner, and the order of the First District Court of Appeals
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
As the First District Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall recognized, genuine issues of material fact rendered Petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment improper. This court should affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals and remand to the Circuit Court for the resolution
of the factual disputes present in this case.
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APPENDIX A
Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute 75 MSC §25-1:
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when they:
(1) Knowingly and intentionally use an eavesdropping device for the
purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation or
intercepts, retains, or transcribes electronic communication unless they
do so with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation or electronic communication.
(b) Definitions:
(1) An eavesdropping device is defined as anything used to hear or
record a conversation, even if the conversation is conducted in person.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term conversation means
any oral communication between 2 (two) or more persons regardless of
whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of
a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.
(3) For purposes of this section, the term electronic communication
means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio,
pager, computer, electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system, where the sending and receiving parties intend the electronic communication to be private and the interception, recording, or transcription
of the electronic communication is accomplished by a device in a surreptitious manner contrary to the provisions of this Article.
(c) Civil remedies to injured parties.
(1) Any or all parties to any conversation upon which eavesdropping
is practiced contrary to this section shall be entitled to the following
remedies:
(A) To an injunction by the circuit court prohibiting further
eavesdropping by the eavesdropper and by or on behalf of their principal,
or either;
(B) To all actual damages against the eavesdropper or their
principal or both;
(C) To any punitive damages which may be awarded by the
court or by a jury.

